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Transfer Programmes? Evidence from Mexico
by Alan de Brauw  and  John Hoddinott, International Food Policy Research Institute
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are an increasingly
popular tool for poverty alleviation. Drawing on lessons learned
from programmes in a variety of countries—notably Mexico’s
PROGRESA programme—they are now found throughout the
developing world. CCTs give cash transfers to households that
meet specific conditions or undertake certain actions, such as
ensuring that school-age children go to school or that pre-school
children regularly see a nurse or doctor.
While empirical evidence demonstrates CCTs improve out
comes related to health, nutrition and education, the desirability
of imposing conditions on beneficiaries to attain those outcomes
is a contentious issue.
Rationales for imposing conditions emerge from both public and
private perspectives. From a public perspective, governments may
perceive that they know the actions or behaviors that will benefit
the poor better than do the poor themselves. Conditioning
transfers then induces changes in behavior that leads to desirable
outcomes. For example, governments may value female education
more than families do. Conditioning may also help the
government overcome information asymmetries.  For instance,
governments may understand the benefits of immunization, while
individuals may be unaware of them. Conditioning transfers on
immunization overcomes this informational asymmetry.
Finally, conditioning may have political economy benefits.
Politicians and policy makers are often evaluated by performance
indicators such as changes in school enrollment or health clinic
use. By conditioning transfers on behaviors that increase these
indicators, politicians and policy makers can provide useful
evidence of accomplishments long before the desired outcome
of poverty reduction occurs.
Conditionality can also provide private benefits. It can strengthen
the bargaining position of women whose preferences are aligned
with the government’s preferences, but who lack bargaining power
within the household. It may overcome stigma effects otherwise
associated with welfare payments. Finally, recent work in behavioral
economics finds that myopic households often undertake actions
that can reduce their own long-term welfare. Conditionality offers
a constraint that limits the adverse effects of this myopia.
Although there are several rationales for conditionality, some have
raised concerns about its imposition. Conditionality is costly, and if
the benefits of conditionality do not outweigh the additional
costs, it may not be worthwhile. The primary public cost is
associated with monitoring behavior, which would not be incurred
without the conditions. Conditionality can create an opportunity for
corruption, as individuals responsible for certifying that conditions
have been met could demand payments for doing so. Conditionality
can also impose costs on beneficiaries, and those costs may not be
borne equally within the household. If the preferences of the poor
do not align the conditions on their behavior, conditionality reduces
welfare gains from participation.
Some households may find the conditions too difficult to
meet; if such households are poor relative to other participants,
imposing conditions may detract from the targeting of the CCT.
Lastly, conditioning transfers can be perceived as demeaning
to the poor, as one can argue that imposing conditions implies that
the poor are either irrational or incapable of understanding their
best interests.
Since conditionality is always part of a CCT programme, it is
not clear whether its benefits actually outweigh the costs outlined
above. To judge the benefits of conditionality, we considered the fact
that some beneficiaries of Mexico’s PROGRESA programme did not
receive the forms needed to monitor the attendance of their children
at school. Therefore their transfers were effectively unconditional.
Using administrative data on transfers in combination with
data collected as part of PROGRESA‘s evaluation, we assessed the
impact of imposing education-related conditions on school
enrollment and attendance. Regardless of empirical technique,
we find that on average children in households that did not receive
the monitoring forms are 7.2 percentage points less likely to enroll
in school. When children were making the transition to lower
secondary school, the impact was even larger, while there was
no measurable impact on children continuing in primary school.
The impact is even more pronounced among households with
illiterate heads.
Our results show that the benefits of conditionalities can be large.
They could also be made much more efficient by calibrating the
design of programmes based on the heterogeneity of the effect
of the conditionality, they could be much more efficient.
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